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Abstract 
Demand Response is a flexibility tool that can provide several benefits to the electric power 
system’s operation, namely by providing ancillary services. Although several countries have 
similar active consumer approaches, the truth is that these methodologies are not always clear or 
transparent to outsiders, and even sometimes to locals (difficult interpretation of legislation). In 
this way, the present paper explains Portuguese price-based and incentive-based demand response 
strategies, and proceed with an analysis and evaluation of the current stage of their 
implementation. Although the programs exist and are available, their actual use are still very 
limited. 
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1. Introduction 
In Portugal, Demand Response (DR) strategies are more focused in price-based programs 
than in incentive-based programs. The price-based ones include market stimulations that 
motivate the consumer to reduce consumption voluntarily and based on its personal interests, 
according to the electricity price. In this way, these programs often reflect a decrease of energy 
costs, or the gain of benefits when in comparison with other consumers. Incentive-based 
programs reflect the interest of third-party entities in the consumption reduction (e.g. ancillary 
services performed by a transmission system operator), and implies monetary remuneration 
[1]. When considering ancillary services, one realizes the huge potential of demand response 
for energy systems and their usefulness for the system operator, since the capability of 
modifying load can be determinant in emergency and security activities [1]. Other European 
countries have developed DR programs, and are today important success references regarding 
the benefits of DR implementation [2].  
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In the next section, the characteristics of price-based and incentive-based programs 
implemented in Portugal are presented. The next section is therefore divided in two 
subchapters: price-based and incentive-based programs. 
2. Price-based DR Programs 
Currently, in Portugal, electricity prices are divided into two seasonal periods for all 
consumers. Time differentiation goes even further when the consumer can choose to consider 
to have its days be equal (daily cycle – only for consumers connected to low voltage) or 
different (weekly cycle), in what concerns the tariffs and hours applied. Hours can be included 
from one to four periods. Fig. 1 presents the tariffs decomposition for the Portuguese scenario. 
In this way, one can see the general composition defined by the regulator (Entidade Reguladora 
dos Serviços Energéticos – ERSE) concerning the implementation of price-based active 
consumer’s programs.  
As one can see by Fig. 1, the consumer has several options to contract supply and can reduce 
its energy costs by choosing the program which grants him lower tariffs in the times of his 
highest consumption, or reduce load in times where the price is higher. The single tariff option 
is the most used by consumers, since the same price is applied across all periods and days. The 
double tariff scheme considers two tariffs, that are applied to on-peak (peak plus mid-peak 
periods) and off-peak periods (valley and super valley periods). In this way, there are several 
successive hours, especially at night, where the energy price is considerably lower. In the triple 
tariff scheme, a tariff is applied in the peak, mid-peak, and off-peak periods [3], [4]. 
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Fig. 1 also presents the different types of schedule available for consumers, namely 
considering, season, day, and hour. As one can see, peak periods are the minority amongst 
other periods as it would be expected, followed by mid-peak periods that are more often, not 
only on week days but also on Saturdays. Finally, off-peak periods (valley and supervalley) 
complement the majority of a week schedule with occupancy on the nights of the week, 
Saturdays, and fully on Sundays. Having the schedule presented in Fig. 2, one can easily apply 
the tariffs from a supplier and perform a cost/benefit analysis according to a particular 
consumer situation.  
3. Incentive-based DR programs 
In Portugal, incentive-based programs are defined through government legislation with a 
common link with the Spanish regulation. Since Portugal belongs to the Iberian market, 
MIBEL, the Portuguese and Spanish legislation are harmonized between each other in order 
to facilitate the energy connections and communication amongst the two countries. In this way, 
Fig. 2 presents the timeline of incentive-based programs legislation publication, in Portugal 
[5]–[13]. 
 
Fig. 2: Portugal’s DR legislation timeline and respective features. 
In Portugal, DR programs are defined by their type, notice time, maximum duration, 
number of periods allowed, and maximum duration per period. In this way, the following Table 
1 presents the characteristics of Portuguese programs.  
Table 1 shows that, per example for the first type of consumer, the transmission system 
operator can perform only one request per day, to a maximum of 5 per week. In each order the 
operator can have a maximum of 3 periods of time, each with a limit of 4 hours. This means 
each request will have a maximum duration of 12 hours. The transmission system operator has 
a limit of 120 hours of use for each consumer, per year. Finally, the operator needs to notify 
the consumer at least 2 hours before the actual interruption period [5]. Each reduction order 
sent by the operator must contain the following [5]: 
 Type of reduction (1, ...,5); 
 Number of periods for request at hand; 
 For each period include: 
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of the interruptible 
consumer’s services 
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consumers, that due to 
their activities, aren’t able 
to participate in interruption 
services 
notifies of an extension 





determines a new 
calculation method 
for some parameters 
present in the 
payment formula. 
Also availability and 
utilization methods 
are evaluated and 
modified  
defines contract limits 
regarding the 
transition of regulated 
to deregulated 
market
presents modifications to parameters and the 
maximum limit of payment for the interruption 
service. Also, the values paid by the transmission 
system operator to consumers participating in 
interruption programs, are evaluated.
presents modifications to parameters 
and the maximum limit of payment for 
the interruption service, regarding 
consumers with an annual 
consumption superior to 75 GWh, and 
average capacity of 50 MW, that 
aren’t connected to very high voltage. 
Also, the requirements of participation 
were changed.
2010 2016
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o The beginning and finish time; 
o Maximum load consumed value by the service provider (consumer). 























3 4 12 
120 




4 5 2 2 
5 0 1 1 
Considering the type of reduction chosen, two options are presented where only reduction 
type 3 can have one or the other: model A (types 3, 4, and 5), or model A+B (types 1, 2, and 
3). Table 2 presents the definitions that are to be considered in order to better understand the 
formulation [5]–[13]. 
Table 2: Portuguese DR programs definitions. 
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Quotient of the difference between the monthly average power of the last 
year interruptible services in peak periods, the maximum load after 








Quotient between the total annual energy consumed and the annual energy 
consumed in peak and mid-peak periods 
- 
FWh  





Monthly calculated according to the consumption made, and equal to: 
FWpc ≥ 2.223, µ=1.9 
2,223 >FWpc≥ 2.095, µ=1.75 
2,095>FWpc ≥ 1.971, µ=1.55 
1.971>FWpc ≥1.852, µ=1.30 
FWpc<1.852, µ=1 - 

 
Monthly calculated according to the consumption made, and equal to: 
FWh ≥ 5500, φ=1.4 
5500>FWh ≥ 4500, φ=1.3 
4500>FWh ≥ 3500, φ=1.2 
FWh<3500, φ=1 
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Daily market price average for the hours where interruption was requested 







hours per month 




* The (a) and (b) indexes are related to reduction types 3, 4, 5, and 1, 2, respectively 
After this parameter definition, one can now evaluate the consumer’s payment formulation. 










ra P pm T   
 
(2) 
Where (1) represents the calculation of availability by the consumer over the course of the 
month (currently set at 18€/MWh maximum), i.e. actual use of DR (consumption reduction) 
isn’t a part of this calculation, and (2), the actual reduction made by the consumer that is 
calculated and added to the previous payment – the operator is obligated to annually perform 
test reduction requests with a minimum duration of one hour, for 10% of the total interruption 
amount for that year. The model A+B is defined as follows: 
 int1016.5ab a a brb rb P          
(3) 
 int1.1ab a a bra ra P pm T      
(4) 
Where (3) represents the calculation of availability by the consumer over the course of the 
month, and (4) the actual reduction made by the consumer that is calculated and added to the 
previous payment. The requirements needed to participate in Portuguese DR programs, 
consider several features of the consumers and is mostly directed to the load consumption and 
capacity of the consumer. The following describe these features [5]: 
 Connection to medium, high, or very high voltage; 
 Minimum load reduction of 4 MW; 
 Install a frequency relay that operates within a frequency interval determined by 
the transmission system operator – Type 5 reduction; 
 Install the required measurement, registry, and control equipment; 
 If the operator wishes to establish a contract, and if in the last three years of 
interruptible load service, the consumer hasn’t failed to deliver twice or more 
times; 
 The activity of the consumer isn’t one of the activities considered essential, i.e. the 
operator can’t contract with [7]: 
o Water, electricity, or natural gas suppliers; 
o Post office or telecommunication companies; 
o Medical associations (hospitals, clinics); 
o Security or national defence organizations (fireman, police); 
o Public transportation sector (including transport security); 
o Public service organizations related to solid or water waste. 
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The penalties for failure to comply with the amount requested, implies the following: 
 If the first time in the last 12 months, the penalty results in a monetary fine equal 
to 4 months of availability remuneration; 
 If the second time in the last 12 months, the penalty results in a monetary fine equal 
to 12 months of availability remuneration; 
 If two or more failures have occurred in the last 12 months, the penalty results in 
a monetary fine equal to 12 months of availability remuneration, and the 
cancellation of the contract with the consumer. 
As one can see, the requirements imposed by the Portuguese legislation regarding the 
participation of consumers in interruptible services, is mostly targeted for large consumers of 
electricity (e.g. voltage level, minimum interruptible amount). In this way, the program isn’t 
embracing other classes of consumers that are more common than the ones considered for the 
DR program, namely, households, apartments, office buildings, small commerce facilities, 
amongst others. By limiting the DR program to a relatively small class of consumers, reduces 
the amount of interruptible load amount available for the transmission system operator. 
4. Analysis of Incentive-based DR in Portugal 
In the present chapter, one performs the analysis of the current status of DR implementation 
in Portugal, regarding incentive-based programs. Table 3 represents the progress of incentive-
based DR in Portugal, since 2013 [14]–[16]. 
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Focusing on the past year, according to [16] by the end of 2015, the transmission system 
operator (Redes Energéticas Nacionais – REN) had interruptible services agreement with 52 
consumers. Of these consumer’s interruptible capacity, 714.2 MW are from model A 
(reduction types 3, 4, and 5), while 696.4 MW are from model A+B (reduction types 1 and 2), 
thus obtaining a total available amount of 1.41 GW. 
As one can see by the previous figures (Fig. 3 and Fig. 4) and Table 3, the progress of 
incentive-based DR is very lacking without a single request in 3 years. This shows that the 
costs to the transmission system operator, REN, are reflected only on the consumer’s 
availability, spending millions of euros each year. In this way, these costs seem as unnecessary 
since the consumers aren’t used at all, and thus an evaluation of the need of flexibility in 
Portugal should be considered in order to clarify if there’s in fact a necessity for flexibility 
resources. Additionally, one can see that the transmission system operator hasn’t fulfilled the 
legislation currently applied, since not even a test reduction request was made across the years 
or else not declared in the annual reports, which is obligated by law, as referred in [6]. 
5. Conclusions 
The present work details the Portuguese legislation in what concerns the use of demand 
response measures, namely, the incentive-based and price-based programs available for 
consumers. Currently, price-based programs are made available by several entities (suppliers, 
retailers, amongst others) and therefore they are more common than incentive-based programs. 
Moreover, consumers connected to higher voltage levels (medium, high, and very high 
voltage) are metered with time differentiation, thus the tariffs used by these consumers have 
to be also time differentiated, namely, four time blocks (peak, mid-peak, valley, and 
supervalley).  
Regarding incentive-based programs, they are only available for consumers connected to 
medium, high, and very high voltage networks. The results about incentive-based programs 
show that these aren’t very used by the transmission system operator, in fact, not at all. The 
consumers with an established agreement are only paid for being available, since their 
activation throughout the years has never been made. This shows a huge loss in terms of DR 
potential and monetary funds that could have been used for other important network-related 
activities. In this way, Portuguese legislation needs to be improved and control mechanisms 
should be implemented, in order to enable a more transparent, attractive, and fair remuneration 
system for DR integration. 
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